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STATUTES SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-17 and § 49-10-6(22) and (23) 
with the changes mandated by House Bill 299 (L. 1985, ch. 108) 
bracketed and underlined. (Pursuant to a recodification of the entire 
retirement code pursuant to Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1987, the current 
definitions of "compensation" and "final average salary" are found in 
Sections 49-2-103(1) and (5) for the Public Employees' (contributory) 
Retirement Act, and Sections 49-3-103(1) and (6) for the Public 
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act). 
49-9-17. Limitation on final average salary in computation 
of retirement benefits. In the administration of the state 
retirement systems assigned to the Utah State Retirement 
Office for administration, the following policies^ among 
others-shaH] apply: 
(a) Final average salary used in the computation of a 
retirement benefit shall be based upon the fixed compensa-
tion regularly paid to the member over the period of time 
specified in the retirement system act under which the 
benefit is being computed. It shall not include 
[overtime? doable time? or] terminal lump-sum payments, 
accumulated lump-sum vacation or sick leave payments, 
severance pay, bonuses, or any other special payments 
including early retirement inducements, except as provided 
to the contrary in the laws governing the separate retire-
ment systems, nor shall the contributions paid by the 
employer and employee to the retirement systems be based 
upon any of the aforementioned special payments in the 
last year of service. 
(b) This policy on the computation of final average 
salary shall take precedence over any and all definitions 
of final average salary included in any and all state 




(22) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" means the 
total amount of payments made by an employer to an 
employee for services rendered to the employer^ inelad-
ing? bat not by way of limitation? all salary? wage and 
overtime payments? bat exclading] which by its nature 
j_2 subject to social security deductions, including 
any payments in excess of the maximum amount subject 
to deduction under social security law. "Compensation," 
"salary," or "wages" does not include: (a) the monetary 
value of remuneration paid in kind, such as residence 
or use of equipment^ [and] (b) all contributions made 
by an employer under this plan or under any other 
employee benefit plan maintained by an employer for 
the benefit of a participant^ (c) salary paid to an^  
employee working under the minimum number of hours 
required for membership; (d) a temporary or exempt 
employee as defined by this section or Section 49-10-14; 
or XiLl terminal lump sum payments, accumulated lump 
sum vacation, sick leave payments, severance pay, or 
any other special payments including early retirement 
inducements. 
(23) "Final average salary" means the rate of the 
average highest annual compensation payable to a member 
for any five years preceding retirement. For purposes 
of computing the member's final average salary only, 
the member is considered to have been in service at his 
last salary rate from the date of the termination of 
employment to the date [his] retirement becomes effec-
tive if the member so requests. If participating 
service is less than five years, then "final average 
salary" means the average annual compensation paid 
to the member during the full period of participating 
service.[ft does not inclade for any member compensa-
tion received for either part-time or special serviee 
rendered in conjanetion with fall time employment 
anless eontribations have been paid on compensation 
received for sach additional servicer] The "final 
average salary" is limited in the computation of that 
part of a member's prior service retirement allowance 
based on service rendered during a period when the 
[said] member received employer contributions on a 
portion of his compensation from an educational 
institution toward the payment of the premium re-
quired on a retirement annuity contract with the 
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Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of 
America or with any other public or private system, 
organization or company to $4,800. This limitation 
is not applicable to members who elected to continue 
in the state retirement system by July 1, 1967. The 
retirement board shall, before July 1, 1979, adjust 
the retirement allowance of any member who retired 
before July 1, 1979. "Average final monthly salary" 
means one-twelfth of the final average salary. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 49-9-19, enacted by L. 1986, ch 71. 
49-9-19. Refunds of vested contributions—Time restric-
tions—Limitations on refunds. 
(1) Refunds of vested contributions made pursuant to law 
in any retirement system to which the contributions were 
made may not be made prior to 60 days from the last day 
the contributions were made, and only upon the termination 
of the member. 
(2) No refund may be made to an active member of any 
retirement system administered by the board unless the 
board determines that the member has service credit, 
which, if calculated on its own, would render that member 
ineligible for membership in the retirement system. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Does the action of the Legislature in using contributions paid 
on secondary employment compensation to enhance retirement benefits 
for Plaintiffs, active members of the State Retirement System, violate 
any vested right or constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
ACTION OF THE COURT BELOW 
This case was heard by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of 
the Third District Court, on June 8, 1987, upon Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Judge 
Sawaya entered judgment for Defendant and Plaintiffs' thereafter filed 
their Notice of Appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs are members of the Utah State Retirement System. 
As such, they are entitled to a retirement benefit upon meeting and 
fulfilling all statutory requirements for receiving a retirement 
benefit. In the case of all of these plaintiffs, the retirement 
statutes, which at the time of the controversy in issue were codified 
under Chapters 9 and 10, Title 49, Utah Code Anotated, 1953, specified 
that the retirement benefit would be based upon plaintiffs' "final 
average salary" multiplied by the number of years of service credited 
to the members. 
2. In order to secure a retirement benefit, plaintiffs and their 
employers contribute a statutorily established amount to the retirement 
office to cover the costs of providing the benefit. This contribution 
amount is based upon the "compensation" received by the member and the 
"final average salary" is computed using "compensation" received by the 
plaintiffs over a period of time. 
3. This controversy has arisen over the definitions of "final 
average salary" and "compensation." 
4. Prior to March 16, 1985, in a provision governing all 
retirement systems, the definition of "final average salary" did not 
include overtime, double-time, or terminal lump sum payments, 
accumulated lumpsum, vacation or sick leave payments, severance 
pay, bonuses, or any other special payments, including early 
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retirement inducements, nor were contributions made by the employers 
and employees to the retirement system to be based on any of these 
aforementioned special payments in the last year of service. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-9-17. 
5. During the same time in question prior to 1985, in the Utah 
State Retirement System, which governed the retirement benefit for the 
Plaintiffs, "final average salary" did not include compensation received 
for either part-time or special service rendered in conjunction with 
full-time employment unless contributions to the retirement system were 
paid on compensation received for this part-time or special service. 
Utah Code Ann., § 49-10-6(23). 
6. The term "compensation" was defined as the total amount of 
payments made by an employer to an employee for services rendered to an 
employer, including all salary, wage and overtime payments. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-10-6(22). 
7. In fulfilling its statutory mandate to implement retirement 
statutes enacted by the Legislature, the retirement board in a 1983 
resolution, "Dual Employment With Same Employer" established a policy 
whereby retirement contributions would be withheld only upon employ-
ment compensation related to the member's normal occupation, and not 
upon totally unrelated employment compensation. However, secondary 
employment which was related to the normal occupation of the member 
would be considered regular employment and contributions to the system 
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would be made on compensation received from that employment. If, 
for some reason, contributions on the "unrelated" employment compensa-
tion were withheld, a member could receive a refund by furnishing 
written documentation establishing the unrelated nature of the employ-
ment. 
8. Then, one year after the passage of the 1983 resolution, the 
1984 Legislature enacted legislation, the primary purpose of which was 
to financially reward teachers for taking additional assignments and 
work performed. This type of compensation, commonly known as "Teacher 
Career Ladders" and codified at Utah Code Ann. § 53-54-1, did not easily 
fit into the current definition of "compensation" under the resolution 
adopted by the retirement board. Thus, in November of 1984, the board 
adopted a replacement resolution expanding its policy set forth in the 
1983 resolution on secondary employment. This 1984 resolution 
established that retirement contributions would be taken only on the 
primary employment of a member, which, in the case of teachers, would 
be determined by the primary contract. All secondary employment 
unrelated to the primary contract, such as career ladder programs, 
summer school, coaching, or other extracurricular assignments for which 
compensation is paid, would not be subject to retirement contributions. 
9. As to refunds of contributions, the 1984 resolution established 
that no refund would be authorized by the board on secondary employment 
contributions unless the employer certified in writing that, as of an 
established date, no more contributions would be paid on that compensa-
tion. 
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10. As is usual and customary in situations involving difficulties 
in interpreting legislative intent in any particular retirement statute, 
the retirement office informed the legislature of the need to clarify 
legislative intent with respect to the definition of compensation, par-
ticularly in terms of compensation subject to contributions and compen-
sation eligible for inclusion in the final average salary computation. 
11. The 1985 Legislature adopted House Bill 299 "RETIREMENT LAW 
AMENDMENTS" by Representative Rob W. Bishop. This bill, effective 
March 16, 1985, established the compensation upon which a member's 
final average salary would be calculated. This new definition, 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(22), focuses on compensation in 
relation to amounts subject to social security deductions. Specifi-
cally, the term compensation is defined as the total amount of payments 
made by an employer to an employee for services rendered to the employer 
which by its nature is subject to social security deductions, including 
any payments in excess of the maximum amount subject to deduction under 
social security law. 
12. For the third time in as many years, the retirement board 
adopted a resolution on this subject, this time to implement the H.B. 
299 definition of compensation, and in particular, to address the 
question of refunding contributions. The board first noted that: 
(a) refunds on contributions for dual or supplemental 
service accrued prior to the effective date of H.B. 299, 
was not authorized by law; 
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(b) refunds of this nature would place the retirement 
system in an actuarially unsound position; and 
(c) the new definition of compensation would benefit 
all future retirees, inasmuch as all service and compensa-
tion would be included in the calculation of the final 
average salary, including the contributions paid on the 
extra service performed. 
As a result of these findings, the board rescinded its action in 
the 1984 resolution and determined that no refunds would be given on 
contributions for dual or supplemental service. 
13. At this point, forms were provided by the retirement office 
to refund contributions which were made on compensation which is 
ineligible for the additional benefits granted by the new definition 
of compensation under H.B. 299. 
14. The 1986 Legislature confirmed the application of this refund 
policy in 1986 by enacting House Bill 161, REFUNDS OF RETIREMENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS, again by Representative Rob W. Bishop. This legislation, 
effective March 17, 1986, stated that no refund could be made to an 
active member of any retirement system administered by the board unless 
the member has service credit which, if calculated on its own, would 
render that member ineligible for membership in the retirement system. 
15. Forms are available at the retirement office for plaintiffs 
and all other members of the system who may have refundable contribu-
tions, to seek refunds of those contributions under current law. Other-
wise, the contributions will be used to enhance the retirement benefit 
upon retirement in accordance with the statutory formula. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs, as active, contributing members of the system, have 
no vested right to a calculation of their benefit with anything but the 
compensation used in determining their benefit at the date of their 
retirement. The 1985 legislative enactment (H.B. 299) establishes 
these rights and is a reasonable and fair classification of members of 
the system for purposes of a legitimate state objective - clarifying 
a confusing and unfair situation with respect to contributions on com-
pensation. Even if plaintiffs had a vested right to the pre- 1985 
compensation calculation, the legislature provided a substantial sub-
stitute for the loss of those contributions by allowing an enhanced 
retirement benefit, or a refund of contributions, depending upon the 
type of service performed by plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO VESTED RIGHT TO BOTH A REFUND 
OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS AND HAVE THE COMPENSATION ON 
WHICH THE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE INCLUDED IN THE 
CALCULATION OF THE FINAL AVERAGE SALARY. THUS, 
EXISTING RETIREMENT STATUTES GOVERN PLAINTIFFS' 
RIGHTS IN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiffs have not argued that the legislature cannot change the 
definition of compensation. Far from it - they admit that "the 1985 
act eliminated much of the problem created by the earlier laws and 
practices of the state retirement system ..." (Appellant's Brief at 
p. 5). It appears that Plaintiffs' problems rest not so much with the 
1985 Legislature's redefinition of compensation, but with the fact that 
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each individual plaintiff may not take advantage of this change in the 
law without immediately retiring. This argument is based on the erron-
eous assumption that plaintiffs have a vested right to have their 
retirement benefit calculated using the pre-1985 definition of compensa-
tion, no matter how many years away from retirement they may be. 
In truth, some benefits do vest to the members' benefit, but they 
do so at the point in time each individual plaintiff meets the qualifi-
cations for receiving a retirement benefit. This principle was clearly 
established by this Court in Driggs v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
Board, 142 P.2d 657 (1943). In Driggs, the Legislature enacted a 
law which diminished the benefit of a retired member of the Teachers' 
Retirement System. The retired member had fulfilled all the statutory 
prerequisites to obtaining a retirement benefit and the Court held that 
the Legislature could not diminish his benefit by a subsequent 
enactment. 
Plaintiffs have not fulfilled the statutory requirements in this 
case. They are active, contributing members, and as the Court in Driggs 
stated: "It should be noted that until all of the conditions are ful-
filled, the pensioner's right is inchoate and not vested." kL at 663. 
Because plaintiffs rights are not vested, they are subject to 
adjustments. In 1985, the legislature amended the definition of com-
pensation. In 1986, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-19(2) 
which states: "No refund may be made to any active member of any 
retirement system administered by the board unless the board determines 
that the member has service credit, which, if calculated on its own, 
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would render that member ineligible for membership in the retirement 
system." Plaintiffs are subject to these provisions. Read together, 
the 1985 and 1986 legislative enactments cited above make it crystal 
clear that the retirement board has no authority to refund any contribu-
tion based on secondary employment unless (a) that compensation alone 
would render the member ineligible for membership in the system, and 
(b) that compensation is, by its nature, not subject to social security 
deductions. 
To illustrate the application of these new laws, consider a 
Plaintiff teacher who, as secondary employment during the summer, 
entered into a contract to do some painting for the state. If con-
tributions or compensation received from this contractual secondary 
employment were paid, the Plaintiff teacher can seek a refund of those 
contributions. 
Conversely, if the contribution on compensation received was. by 
its nature, subject to social security deductions, as in the case of a 
Plaintiff teacher who received extra compensation under the "Teacher 
Career Ladder" plan, then that additional compensation is included in 
the calculation of the final average salary. By adopting the social 
security standard for determining compensation, the legislature signifi-
cantly enhanced the retirement benefit for all employees, Plaintiffs 
included, by allowing certain portions of their secondary employment to 
be included in the compensation received for purposes of determining 
the final average salary, and consequently, the retirement benefit 
itself. Contributions on compensation not used in the calculation of 
the final average salary are refunded to the employee in accordance with 




EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO A 
BENEFIT CALCULATION UPON RETIREMENT BASED UPON 
PRE-1985 LAW, A SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE WAS PROVIDED 
BY THE 1985 ENACTMENT. 
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the right to a refund 
or to have the secondary employment compensation included in the 
calculation of the final average salary is a vested right, the 
Legislature has provided a substantial substitute for this through the 
enactment of the 1985 act. 
This "substantial substitute" doctrine, first enunciated by this 
Court in Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement 
Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (1952), establishes that the legislature can-
not take away vested rights unless it offers a substantial substitute. 
In this case, a substantial substitute is clearly identified by 
the legislature. The benefit of any Plaintiff who has secondary employ-
ment compensation which, by its nature, is subject to social security 
deductions, will have that compensation used in calculating final 
average salary and will "substantially" enhance his benefit. 
ARGUMENT 
III. 
BOTH THE LEGISLATURE. IN ENACTING THE DEFINITION OF 
COMPENSATION, AND THE BOARD, IN APPLYING THE LAW TO 
PLAINTIFFS, HAVE TREATED SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVID-
UALS IN THE SAME MANNER, AND THUS NO VIOLATION OF 
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION HAS OCCURRED. 
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The 1985 legislative enactment creates a clear distinction between 
two classes of members under the retirement system. The first class is 
comprised of those members who have secondary employment and have paid 
contributions on compensation received from that employment, which com-
pensation would, by its nature, be subject to social security deduc-
tions. These members will have that compensation used in the calcula-
tion of the final average salary and thus, they will receive a signifi-
cantly enhanced retirement benefit. Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(22). 
The second class is comprised of those members who have secondary 
employment and have paid contributions on that employment, which, stand-
ing alone, would render the member ineligible for membership in the 
retirement system and which, by its nature, is not subject to social 
security deductions. These members will not have the secondary employ-
ment compensation used in calculating the final average salary. 
Instead, they receive a refund of those contributions in accordance 
with law. 
Two cases decided by this Court have discussed the issue of classi-
fication in a retirement system setting. The first case, Hansen v. 
Public Employees' Retirement System Board of Administration, 246 P.2d 
591 (1952) involved a classification of employees for purposes of 
liquidating the public employees retirement system. The particular 
challenge in Hansen was based upon the legislature's differentiation, 
for benefit purposes, between members with ten or more years of service, 
and those with less than ten years of service. The Plaintiff Hansen 
claimed that the classification was unreasonably discriminatory and, 
therefore, unconstitutional. The Hansen Court upheld the legislative 
classification and held: 
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As to discrimination: An act is never unconstitu-
tional because of discrimination so long as there 
is some reasonable basis for differentiation 
between classes which is related to the purposes 
to be accomplished by the act. And it applies 
uniformly to all members within the class. Id. at 597 
While the Court noted that the legislature could differentiate 
between members of a retirement system based on length of service, it 
also listed other important factors which the legislature could properly 
consider in making classifications, and included in these were admin-
istrative convenience and expense, Id. at 598. 
Similarly in this case, the legislature made a classification of 
members of the system for "compensation" purposes, not on the basis of 
the length of service performed, as in Hansen, but on the type of 
employment performed. The affidavit of the retirement director esta-
blishes that enormous expense and administrative inconvenience would 
be involved in providing for refunds to Plaintiffs. Thus, Hansen 
provides clear precedent for the legislature's classification scheme 
in this case. 
The second case, Bryson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 573 P.2d 
1280 (1978), involved a similar equal protection challenge brought by 
a number of police officers and firefighters seeking a refund of contri-
butions made to their respective retirement systems. This challenge was 
based on the legislative establishment of different retirement systems 
with different refund provisions for each system, with plaintiffs' 
system mandating a lesser refund to plaintiffs' system than those in 
the other systems. 
-12-
Again, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the legislative classifica-
tion, stating: 
It is recognized that this setting up of the four 
separate retirement systems does divide public 
employees into separate classes and treats each 
class differently. But it is a well established 
principle of law that people may thus be divided 
into classes, if that classification bears some 
reasonable relationship to the objective sought 
to be accomplished; and there is no invidious 
discrimination so long as all persons within the 
same class are treated the same way. k L at 1282. 
Similarly here, the objective sought to be accomplished by the 
passage of the 1985 act was a clarification of statutes and board 
interpretations which had theretofore been confusing and unfair. This 
was well within the legislative prerogative and affects all Plaintiffs 
in the same way, whether they are in the first or the second class 
established for "compensation" purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate that this question could not be resolved admin-
istratively. Plaintiffs request that they be allowed to have, at their 
option, either a refund of contributions with interest, or an inclusion 
of the compensation on which the contributions were made included in the 
calculation of the final average salary. In other words, they would 
like to "have their cake and eat it too." 
Even if the board refunds their contributions, it does not change 
the application of the 1985 enactment to plaintiffs, and therefore, they 
would have a double benefit while only contributing for one benefit. 
The 1985 Legislature recognized the problems with the definition of 
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compensation and its application to the final average salary calcula-
tion and changed that application prospectively to all active members 
of the system. This has resulted in a classification of members which 
is both reasonable and fair. Additional benefits have been granted 
using this new approach, and will be paid for by contributions made to 
the system in the past and contributions to be made in the future. 
This is consistent with statutory and case law, and is not violative of 
either Plaintiffs1 rights to equal protection or any other vested right 
held by Plaintiffs under the system. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the 
judgment below be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ManK A. Madsen 
Attorney for Respondent 
Utj4h State Retirement Board 
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